Abstract
Theoretical papers show that there could be a welfare gain from switching to tax regulation if managers are more uncertain about key parameters of a fishery than fishers. We estimate the size of the welfare gain that would result if a manager of the Danish cod fishery in the Kattegat switched from the current individual transferable quota system to tax regulation. We find that this would generate a small welfare gain of 0.023% of the industry profit and variations in parameter values (± 20%) at most result in a gain of 0.039%.
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In this issue
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- Article
- Abstract
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Literature on Taxes versus ITQs in Fisheries
- 3. General Simulation Model
- 4. Specific Functional Forms
- 5. The Danish Cod Fishery in the Kattegat and Parameter Estimation
- 6. Simulation Results for the Danish Cod Fishery in the Kattegat
- 7. Conclusion
- Acknowledgments
- Footnotes
- References
- Figures & Data
- Supplemental
- Info & Metrics
- References
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