Abstract
Deterrence mechanisms have garnered renewed interest as policy instruments to curb overexploitation of natural resources. In this study, deterrence is understood as inherently multidimensional, comprising the severity, celerity, and certainty of punishment. We use an instrumental variables approach to econometrically assess the effectiveness of these dimensions in reducing deforestation in the Brazilian savanna. The empirical results underscore the significance of severity and bureaucratic effectiveness, reflected in the certainty and celerity of enforcement, in curbing deforestation. These findings highlight the need to adopt a multidimensional legal and institutional framework to prevent deforestation in the region.
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