Abstract
This study analyses whether the land tenure insecurity problem decreases long-term land improvements (liming and phosphorus fertilization) under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Nordic production conditions in the European Union (EU) countries, such as Finland. Our study suggests that under the traditional cash lease contracts, which are encouraged by the existing land leasing regulations and agricultural subsidy programs, the land tenure insecurity problem on leased land decreases land improvements that have a long pay-back period. In particular, soil pH was found to be significantly lower in the land cultivated under a lease contract compared to land owned by the farmers themselves. (JEL Q15, Q24, Q28)
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