Abstract
This paper uses bargaining dynamics, administrative politics, and agency theory to examine financial outcomes from New Zealand land reform. Results are inconsistent with payments arising from a bargain in which both the Crown and lessee advocate to their full potential, and are instead consistent with the Crown backing down to lessees’ desires for a generous deal. This back-down stems either from “bureaucratic coping,” or from the addition of a bureaucratic middleman between the Crown principal and its negotiator subagent, exacerbating the principal-agent problem. (JEL K11, Q28)
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In this issue
Jump to section
- Article
- Abstract
- I. Introduction: Land Reform in the New Zealand High Country
- II. Analytics and Hypotheses
- III. Results
- IV. Discussion
- V. Conclusion
- Appendix A Property Rights in Land Generally and Pastoral Leases Specifically23
- Appendix B Tenure Review and Leasehold Improvements
- Appendix C Simulating Four Variants of Hypothesis 1
- Appendix D Deriving and Estimating the Fixed-Paymentratio Pricing Scheme
- Footnotes
- References
- Figures & Data
- Info & Metrics
- References