Investment Drivers in a Fishery with Tradable Quotas

Linda Nøstbakken

Abstract

I analyze drivers of investment in a fishery with tradable quotas. Theory predicts that tradable quotas increase efficiency because efficient firms buy quotas from less efficient firms. I identify what drives investment, using data on Norwegian purse seiners. Results show that while the basic economic investment model explains investment within firms, it does not explain differences between firms. These differences are explained by other firm-specific factors such as geographical location, whether it is a family firm, and prices paid for quotas. Consequently, investment strategies are not necessarily driven by efficiency considerations, and quota trade may not increase allocative efficiency. (JEL Q22, Q28)

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