Additionality and the Adoption of Farm Conservation Practices

Mariano Mezzatesta, David A. Newburn and Richard T. Woodward

Abstract

We use propensity score matching to estimate additionality from enrollment in federal costshare programs for six practices. We analyze farmer adoption decisions based on farmer survey data in Ohio. We develop a new methodological approach to decompose the average treatment effect on the treated according to relative contributions of voluntary adopters and new adopters. Our results indicate that cost-share programs achieve positive levels of additionality for each practice. But percent additionality varies dramatically between practices. Specifically, percent additionality is highest for hayfield establishment (93.3%), cover crops (90.6%), and filter strips (88.9%), while it is lowest for conservation tillage (19.3%). (JEL Q24, Q28)

I. Introduction

Federal agricultural conservation programs, such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and Environmental Quality Improvement Program (EQIP), have invested billions of dollars to incentivize farmers to enhance environmental benefits. Starting in 2002, the portion of funding for major U.S. Department of Agriculture conservation programs allocated to working-lands programs have increased considerably relative to land retirement programs (Claassen, Cattaneo, and Johansson 2008). The effectiveness of federal cost-share programs depends in part on whether payments induce a positive change in farmer behavior. In this paper, we use propensity score matching methods to estimate the level of additionality from enrollment in costshare programs for six conservation practices.

Additionality refers to whether “the environmental services that are supported under a given program would have been provided in the absence of the payment” (Horowitz and Just 2011). This issue has received increasing attention as a wide range of programs are being proposed and implemented to induce landowners to adopt changes in land use and management practices that provide environmental improvements in climate, water quality, and species habitat (Horowitz and Just 2011; van Bentham and Kerr 2010; Zhang and Wang 2011). The challenge of quantifying additionality arises when a program manager seeks to induce landowners to provide impure public goods, that is, goods with both private and public benefits (Mason and Plantinga 2011). Because conservation actions often generate private net benefits for landowners, they often are adopted even without any payment. Due to information asymmetry, the program manager cannot observe what the enrolled farmer would have done without payment, and, thus, program evaluation to determine additional conservation effort requires this counterfactual to be estimated.

Propensity score matching estimators were developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and are often used for program evaluation to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Matching estimators pair treated and untreated individuals who are similar in terms of observable characteristics in order to correct for sample selection bias induced by nonrandom program enrollment. These methods have been used for program evaluation in several contexts pertaining to conservation. For example, Andam et al. (2008) analyzed the effect of protected areas in reducing deforestation rates in Costa Rica and found that the rate of deforestation in protected areas was 11% lower than in similar unprotected areas. Matching methods have been used to analyze the effect of land use policies aimed at reducing farmland loss (Liu and Lynch 2011) and reducing future urban development (Bento, Towe, and Geoghegan 2007; Butsic, Lewis, and Ludwig 2011). Ferraro, McIntosh, and Ospina (2007) used matching methods to analyze the impact of the U.S. Endangered Species Act on species recovery rates and found significant improvements in recovery rates but only when the listing was combined with substantial government funding for habitat protection.

While the studies mentioned above focused primarily on programs or polices that protect against future land use conversion, federal cost-share programs incentivize the adoption of conservation practices for land restoration. Using regression analysis to analyze the effect of CRP on land retirement, Lubowski, Plantinga, and Stavins (2008) estimate a discrete choice land use change model with Natural Resource Inventory data where CRP is included as an alternative. They find that approximately 90% of land enrolled under CRP constitutes additional land retirement, implying that CRP significantly increases the likelihood of land retirement. Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez (2011) estimate the impact on land allocation of a cost-share program in Maryland using a switching regression model. They find that cost-share funding induced farmers to adopt conservation practices they would not have used without funding; however, it also has the unintended consequence of inducing slippage (i.e., pasture and vegetative cover converted to cropland).

In this paper, we estimate the level of additionality from enrollment in cost-share programs for six conservation practices. We apply matching estimators to quantify additionality, estimated as the ATT and defined as the average increase in the proportion of the land adopted in a conservation practice for enrolled farmers relative to their counterfactual proportion of the land in this practice that they would have adopted without funding. Our study analyzes conservation adoption and enrollment decisions using data from a farmer survey in Ohio. The survey includes farmer enrollment in major federal conservation programs, such as CRP, EQIP, and others. We estimate the ATT for six conservation practice types: conservation tillage, cover crops, hayfield establishment, grid sampling, grass waterways, and filter strips.

We develop a new methodological approach to decompose the ATT according to the relative contributions of new adopters and voluntary adopters. “New adopters” refers to enrolled farmers who would not have adopted the practice without receiving funding. “Voluntary adopters” refers to those enrolled farmers who would have adopted the practice even in the absence of cost-share funding. Although we do not observe the counterfactual on what enrolled farmers would have done without funding, matching estimators are used to estimate the likelihood that enrolled farmers are voluntary adopters or new adopters, in addition to estimating the relative contribution for each group to the overall ATT.

Our empirical analysis provides three main results. First, the overall ATT for enrollment in cost-share programs is positive and statistically significant for each of the six practice types. That is, cost-share programs induce farmers to increase the average proportion of conservation acreage adopted for all practices. Second, we find that the percent additionality varies dramatically between practice types. Here, percent additionality is defined as the percentage of the observed conservation practice for enrolled farmers that can be attributable to receiving cost-share funding. The percent additionality is highest for hayfield establishment (93.3%), cover crops (90.6%), and filter strips (88.9%), while it is lowest for conservation tillage (19.3%). Third, the decomposition of the ATT into the relative contributions of voluntary adopters and new adopters provides valuable policy insights. For instance, the ATT for voluntary adopters is not significant for all practice types, implying that voluntary adopters do not significantly expand the proportion of conservation acreage when receiving cost-share funding. Decomposition estimates also suggest that the differences in percent additionality between practice types are mainly determined by the fraction of enrolled farmers who are voluntary adopters and new adopters. Practice types that are estimated to have a large fraction of new adopters, such as filters trips and hayfield establishment, exhibit larger values for percent additionality.

II. Decomposition of the Propensity Score Matching Estimator

In this section, we formalize the ATT and discuss the identification assumptions. Then, we develop the propensity score matching estimator and derive the decomposition of the ATT. We first provide a simple economic model of adoption decisions of conservation practices with and without cost-share funding. Chouinard et al. (2008) review this extensive literature on the diverse array of economic, social, and attitudinal factors influencing conservation adoption and enrollment decisions. Chouinard et al. (2008) explain that farmers will choose the level of conservation that maximizes their utility, which sometimes results in a less than maximum profit. In Figure 1, we present two hypothetical cases of farmers who have enrolled in a cost-share program (D = 1) to implement a conservation practice. The solid lines represent the private net benefits to the farmer of adopting a conservation practice without cost-share funding, while the dashed line represents the private net benefits with cost-share funding. We assume that the adoption of a practice has fixed costs, but that initial increases in y cause increase in the net benefits to the farmer (e.g., reducing soil erosion). We further assume that there is a netbenefit maximizing level of adoption, beyond which marginal private costs exceed marginal benefits.

Figure 1

Net Benefits to a Farmer from Adopting a Conservation Practice without Cost-Share Funding (solid line) and with Cost-Share Funding (dashed line)

In Figure 1 on the left, we present the case of a new adopter who would not adopt the practice without funding, Y0 = 0, since the practice has negative net private benefits at all levels. For a new adopter, the cost-share payment induces the farmer from conservation level Y0 = 0 without funding to Y1 with funding, yielding a treatment effect of Y1. In Figure 1 on the right, the case of a voluntary adopter is shown in which the farmer's net benefits are positive even for the counterfactual without cost-share funding, such that the farmer chooses to adopt conservation level, Y0 >0. For voluntary adopters, a positive treatment effect occurs only if the farmers expand their practice due to receiving funding, resulting in a treatment effect of Y1Y0.

Propensity Score Matching Estimator

Our empirical goal is to estimate the ATT from enrollment, while also decomposing ATT into the relative contributions from new adopters and voluntary adopters. We define an indicator variable D equal to one if a farmer enrolled in a cost-share program to fund the adoption of a conservation practice, and D equals zero if a farmer did not enroll. Further, we define the potential outcome variables Y1 and Y0 for each farmer and practice type. Let Y1 be the proportion of farm acreage in the conservation practice if a farmer enrolled in a program (D = 1), and let Y0 be the proportion of farm acreage in the conservation practice if the farmer did not enroll (D = 0), where 0 ≤ Y0 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ Y1 ≤ 1. We can observe only one of these two outcome variables for any given farmer.

The treatment effect of enrollment in a cost-share program is defined as the increase in the proportion of conservation acreage adopted with program enrollment relative to the proportion without being enrolled, τ = Y1Y0. We define the additionality as the average treatment effect on the treated (enrolled) group of farmers:

Embedded Image [1]

The application of matching estimators to estimate the ATT requires that two identification assumptions be made. The first assumption, often called the unconfoundedness assumption, states that the potential outcome Y0 must be independent of program enrollment, conditional on the set of observable covariates X, in other words, Embedded Image (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997). This assumption implies that differences in outcomes between enrolled and nonenrolled farmers with the same values for covariates are attributable to enrollment. The vector of covariates X should affect both the farmer decision on enrollment and the potential outcomes. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrated that if the unconfoundedness condition is satisfied, then it is also true that Y0 is independent of program enrollment conditional on the propensity score, in other words, Embedded Image, where the propensity score is defined as the probability of enrollment conditional on X, P = P (D = 1⎪X). The propensity scores are often estimated using discrete choice models, typically a probit or logit model.

The second identification assumption states that for all farmer characteristics X, there is a positive probability for both enrolled or nonenrolled farmers, that is, 0<P(D = 1⎪X) < 1. This overlap assumption, also known as the common support condition, implies that for each enrolled farmer there exists a positive probability of a match within the group of nonenrolled farmers with a similar set of covariates X.

Let H1 denote the set of I enrollees and H0 the set of J nonenrollees that are on common support. Each enrollee and nonenrollee has a vector of characteristics, Xiand Xj, and propensity scores, Pi and Pj, respectively, where i = 1, ..., I and j = 1, ..., J. Propensity scores on the probability of enrollment are estimated from a probit model, such that Pi= P(Di = 1⎪Xi) for iH1 and Pj = P(Dj = 1 ⎪Xj) for jH0.

The primary goal of the matching process is to obtain for all iH 1, a counterfactual estimate, Embedded Image of what the enrolled farmer would have done without cost-share funding. The counterfactual estimate, Embedded Image is a weighted average,

Embedded Image [2]

where Embedded Image is the observed outcome for the nonenrollee jH0.1 A variety of matching algorithms are available to construct the weights W(i, j) in [2] (Guo and Fraser 2010). For example, the propensity score kernel matching uses the nonenrollees in H 0 as matches, and the weights W (i, j) are determined based on a kernel function, a bandwidth parameter, and the differences between Pi and Pj. The weights are normalized so that Embedded Image for each enrolled farmer i. The matching estimators for E[Y1D = 1] and E [Y0D = 1] in equation [1] are, respectively,

Embedded Image [3]

Hence, the matching estimator for the ATT in equation [1] is

Embedded Image [4]

Decomposing the ATT for New Adopters and Voluntary Adopters

As discussed above, we define voluntary and new adopters based on their potential outcome Y0. The potential outcome Y0 for enrolled farmers is not observed and must be estimated. Hence, we define the probabilities Pn = P(Y0 = 0⎪D = 1) and Pv= P(Y0 > 0⎪ D = 1), which are, respectively, the expected probabilities that the enrolled farmers are either new adopters or voluntary adopters. Given that Y0 ≥ 0, it holds that

Embedded Image [5]

Using conditional expectations and these probabilities based on Y0, the ATT in equation [1] can be decomposed into two parts reflecting the relative amounts of the ATT that are attributable to new adopters and voluntary adopters, respectively:

Embedded Image [6]

The first part represents the portion of the ATT that corresponds to new adopters. The term E [Y1Y0 = 0,D = 1] is the expected proportion of acreage that new adopters dedicate to the conservation practice when receiving funding. Meanwhile, E [Y0Y0 = 0, D = 1] is the expected proportion new adopters dedicate to the practice when not receiving funding, which equals zero by definition. The difference of these two terms equals the expected additional proportion of acreage that new adopters dedicate to the conservation practice when receiving funding. The second part in [6] represents the portion of the ATT that corresponds to voluntary adopters. The difference in the two terms E[Y1Y0 > 0, D = 1] and E[Y0Y0 > 0, D = 1] is equal to the expected additional proportion of acreage that voluntary adopters dedicate to the conservation practice as a result of receiving funding. The overall ATT in equation [6] equals the weighted average of these two expected increases in the proportion of conservation acreage adopted attributable to receiving funding.

To simplify notation, we define the respective ATT for enrolled new adopters and voluntary adopters as

Embedded Image [7]

The decomposed ATT in [6] can be rewritten as

Embedded Image [8]

Below we derive the estimators for each of the decomposed terms in equation [8].

Estimators for the Probabilities of New Adopters and Voluntary Adopters

In this section, we derive the estimators for Pn and Pv in equation [8]. We first define a binary variable B0 to explain how matching estimators are used to derive the estimators for these probabilities. Specifically, B0 equals one if a farmer would adopt a practice without funding, and zero otherwise, that is, B0 = 1 if Y0 > 0, and B0 = 0 if Y0 = 0. The probability that Y0 is greater than zero, Pv, can be expressed in terms of the expectation of B0:

Embedded Image [9]

An estimator for E [B0D = 1] can be obtained using a matching estimator, analogous to the approach used on the estimator for E [Y0D = 1] in equation [3]. This yields the estimate for Pv, and the estimate for the other probability, Pn, can be obtained using [5].

Similar to equation [2], the matching estimator for Embedded Image is the weighted average

Embedded Image [10]

where Embedded Image is the B0 for nonenrollee j. Note that Embedded Image is the estimate of the probability that an enrolled farmer with propensity score Pi is a voluntary adopter, such that Embedded Image. The matching estimator for E [B0D = 1] is then the average of the Embedded Image for the set of I enrollees in H1, such that

Embedded Image

Consequently, given equations [9] and [10], the estimator for Pv is

Embedded Image [11]

and the estimator for Pn is obtained by substituting [11] into [5]:

Embedded Image [12]

Estimators for the ATT of New Adopters and Voluntary Adopters

In this section, we provide estimators of ATTn for new adopters and ATTv for voluntary adopters that are defined in equation [7], respectively. We first provide estimators for the conditional expectations of Y1, then for the conditional expectations of Y 0, and finally take the difference in the conditional expectations to arrive at respective estimators for ATTn and ATTv.

The estimator for the conditional expectation of Y1 for new adopters is

Embedded Image [13]

This estimator is the average value of Y1 across all I enrollees weighted by the estimated probability that the enrollee is a new adopter, Embedded Image. Likewise, the estimator for the conditional expectation of Y1 for voluntary adopters is

Embedded Image [14]

which is the estimator for the average value of Y1 across all I enrollees weighted by the estimated probability that the enrollee is a voluntary adopter, Embedded Image.

The estimator for the conditional expectation of Y0for new adopters, E[ YY0= 0,D =1], equals zero by definition, as noted previously. The estimator for the conditional expectation of Y 0 for voluntary adopters is

Embedded Image [15]

where we have substituted Eˆ [Y0⎪D = 1] in equation [3] and Pˆ(Y0>0⎪D = 1) in equation [11] into equation [15] above.2

After substituting [13] into the expression for ATTn found in equation [7] and noting that E [ Y0Y0 = 0, D = 1] = 0, we obtain the estimator for the ATT of new adopters:

Embedded Image [16]

Similarly, after substituting [14] and [15] into the expression for ATTv in equation [7], we obtain the estimator for the ATT of voluntary adopters:

Embedded Image [17]

The estimator for the overall ATT in equation [8] is

Embedded Image [18]

where the proposed estimators for the decomposed parts in equations [11], [12], [16], and [17] are substituted into equation [18] above. In the Appendix, we validate that this yields the same expression as the estimator for the overall ATT in equation [4].

III. Data in Farmer Survey

For this study, we conducted a farmer survey in southwestern Ohio within 25 counties in and around the Great Miami River Watershed. The study area is dominated by agricultural uses (83% of land area), particularly for row-crop production in corn, soybeans, and wheat. Typical livestock operations include swine, beef cattle, and dairy. Our survey questionnaire was conducted in 2009 through the Ohio Division of the National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS). The sample of farmers was drawn from the NASS master list of farmers, and a random stratified sampling was used to ensure a sufficient number of responses from large commercial farms. The survey was mailed to 2,000 farmers, with follow-up phone calls. There was a total of 773 survey respondents. However, useable responses varied by practice type, depending on whether the farmer completed the survey information for each practice type. The survey contains questions on farmer socioeconomic characteristics, farm management, and land quality characteristics. Our unit of analysis is the farm property. This represents the farmer's overall management decisions for adopting conservation practices, although we acknowledge that this aggregates some farm-level variation in land quality characteristics (e.g., slope, soil type, proximity to water) across specific plots or fields.

The survey included questions on the acreage adopted for the following six conservation practices in 2009: conservation tillage, cover crops, hayfield (or grassland) establishment, grid sampling, grass waterways, and filter strips. Conservation tillage leaves crop residue on fields to reduce soil erosion and runoff. Cover crops provide soil cover and absorb nutrients on cropland when the soil would otherwise be bare. Hayfield establishment retires cropland to a less intensive state to provide habitat and other conservation benefits. Grid sampling improves the efficiency of nutrient application rates to maximize crop yields, while reducing excess fertilizer that potentially would run off or leach into surrounding water bodies. Grass waterways are located in the natural drainage areas within cropland to reduce soil erosion and gully formation. Filter strips are typically planted grass along stream banks to capture sediment, nutrients, and pesticides from runoff before they enter surrounding water bodies. We categorize these six practices into two groups. First, practices for environmentally sensitive areas (filter strips and grass waterways) are almost exclusively used along stream banks or in natural drainage areas, respectively. Second, field practices (conservation tillage, cover crops, hayfield establishment, and grid sampling) are often adopted as a practice for a significant portion of the cropland.

For each practice type, the survey asks whether the farmer received funding from enrollment in any cost-share programs. Federal programs included explicitly in the survey are EQIP, CRP, Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP), and Conservation Security Program (CSP). CRP funding in the region was almost exclusively under “continuous sign-up,” which is a noncompetitive process for funding conservation practices on working lands (not the “general sign-up” CRP with competitive bidding for land retirement).3 CREP is a program similar to the CRP continuous sign-up on working lands, except that it is a state-federal conservation partnership focused on small areas or specific watersheds (Claassen, Cattaneo, and Johansson 2008). EQIP is a working-land conservation program that also provides financial support to eligible farmers to establish certain conservation practices; however, unlike CRP continuous sign-up, EQIP has a budget cap where only about three-quarters of the practices are funded in this region. CSP provides cost-share funding for working lands for both new and existing conservation practices. The Great Miami River Watershed has a regional water quality trading program (WQTP) (Newburn and Woodward 2012). The WQTP was included in the survey because it similarly provides cost-share funding for conservation practices. An “other” option was also included in the survey to capture any other federal or state conservation programs not already listed above, such as wetland and grasslands programs.

Eligibility for conservation programs is typically dependent on factors such as land type, land use, practices adopted, and location (Claassen, Cattaneo, and Johansson 2008). For example, programs typically require that farmers have a history of crop production or that the land be classified as highly erodible land (HEL). Marginal farmland that is adjacent to streams is also typically eligible if it can be used to adopt practices, such as riparian buffers or filter strips, that improve water quality. In our analysis, covariates that serve as proxies for eligibility requirements include the slope of the land, the percentage of farm acreage dedicated to crop production, whether streams are present on the property, and whether the land is classified as HEL.

Table 1 reports farmer decisions on conservation practice adoption and program enrollment for the six practice types. Farmer decisions are categorized into three groups: no adoption, adoption without enrollment, and adoption with enrollment. For example, conservation tillage has 97 farmers who did not adopt this practice, 368 farmers who adopted without enrollment (i.e., self-funded), and 86 farmers who enrolled in a cost-share program for this practice. Table 1 also provides the average proportion for the conservation acreage adopted relative to the total farm acreage for enrolled and nonenrolled farmers who adopted a practice.4 Note that nonenrolled farmers with no adoption for the practice have an average proportion equal to zero, by definition. There are two things to understand from the data on proportions in Table 1. First, the average proportion adopted for enrolled farmers is greater or equal to the proportion for nonenrolled farmers who adopted a practice for all practices. Second, the average proportions for the four field practices are much larger than the two environmentally sensitive practices. The reason is that filter strips and grass waterways, by design, are solely focused along stream banks and in natural drainage areas rather than across the entire field and, thus, represent a smaller proportion of total farm acreage.

Table 1

Farmer Adoption, Enrollment, and Average Proportion of Conservation Acreage Adopted on Total Farm Acreage by Practice Type

For our empirical analysis, the treatment group for a given practice type is comprised of farmers who enrolled in any cost-share program for this practice. The control group is comprised of farmers who did not enroll in any program for this practice.5 Table 2 summarizes farmer enrollment in the cost-share programs. CRP was the dominant funding source for enrolled farmers who adopted grass waterways and hayfield establishment. However, there was not a single dominant funding source for enrolled farmers who adopted conservation tillage, filter strips, cover crops, or grid sampling.6 Enrollment in the Great Miami WQTP represents only a small fraction of overall enrollment in Table 2 because this program was still in a pilot phase when the survey was conducted in 2009. When estimating additionality for each practice type, we focus primarily on the effect of receiving cost-share support from any of the conservation programs discussed above. In the robustness check section below, we further examine whether the estimation results for additionality differ significantly between the three largest programs (EQIP, CRP, and CSP) for those practices that have a sufficient number of enrolled farmers. In particular, the CSP rules are known to allow cost-share funding for both new and existing conservation practices. As such, CSP funds may be directed toward subsidizing conservation effort that is not additional.

Table 2

Farmer Enrollment in Cost-Share Programs by Practice Type

As an example, we provide in Table 3 the summary statistics of the covariates, prior to matching, for enrolled and nonenrolled farmers for the grass waterways practice. We also included t-statistics on the differences in the covariate sample means for the two groups. For example, the sample mean of the HEL variable is 0.610 for enrolled farmers and 0.317 for nonenrolled farmers, which is significantly different at the 99% level. Other covariates are also statistically different in their means for enrolled and nonenrolled farmers, including farm revenue, proportion in grain crops, low and medium slope, farm size, stream adjacency, and the presence of livestock. Similarly, the other five practice types exhibit statistically significant differences in the sample means of several covariates before matching is conducted.

Table 3

Summary Statistics on Covariates for Enrolled and Nonenrolled Farmers for Grass Waterways

Propensity scores are estimated for each practice type using a probit model, where the dependent variable is the enrollment decision and the covariates X are used as explanatory variables. The estimated probit coefficients for grass waterways are provided in Table 4, where the covariates used in the estimation are those in Table 3.7 The covariates for grass waterways that are significant are HEL, medium and high income, proportion in grain crops, farm size, and stream adjacency. The significance of covariates in the probit estimation varied by practice type. For example, for filter strips the covariates on farm revenue, education, proportion in grain crop, and stream adjacency are all significant at the 95% level or higher. While for conservation tillage, the covariates on HEL, proportion in grain crop, and education level exceeding high school are significant.

Table 4

Estimated Coefficients from Probit Model to Compute Propensity Scores for Cost-Share Enrollment in Grass Waterways

Table 3 also provides the summary statistics on covariates, after matching on the propensity scores, for enrolled and nonenrolled farmers for the grass waterways practice. Propensity score matching in Table 3 is based on kernel matching with the Gaussian kernel and bandwidth at 0.06. Covariates in Table 3 were verified to be balanced across matched groups of enrolled and nonenrolled farmers using a two-group t-test that checks for differences in the covariate means across the two groups.8 That is, all covariates with significant differences in the means prior to matching are no longer significant after matching. All covariates were balanced successfully after matching for the other five practice types at the 95% level.

The application of propensity score matching additionally requires that the covariates are balanced, given the propensity score (Deheija and Wahba 1999). To test whether the covariates are balanced conditional on the propensity score, the probit model specification for each practice type was evaluated using the balancing algorithm explained in Becker and Ichino (2002). This test divides farmers into strata based on equal intervals of the estimated propensity score. Within each stratum, a test is conducted to assess whether there is no significant difference in the means for each covariate between enrolled and nonenrolled farmers. This assures that the propensity scores used for comparison are balanced in the underlying covariates. The probit model specification for each practice type satisfied the balancing test for all covariates.

IV. Estimation Results

Additionality and Decomposed Effects

In this section, we provide the estimation results on additionality and the decomposed components of the ATT for the six conservation practices. Table 5 provides the estimates for the overall ATT, %ATT, and each component of the decomposed ATT for all practices types. The estimation in Table 5 is performed using propensity score kernel matching with the Gaussian kernel type, where the common support requirement is enforced and the kernel bandwidth is 0.06.9 The standard errors and 95% confidence intervals were generated using a bootstrap procedure based on 1,000 simulations.10

Table 5

Average Treatment Effect on the Treated and Decomposed Effects for New Adopters and Voluntary Adopters Using Propensity Score Kernel Matching (Kernel Type: Gaussian, Bandwidth = 0.06)

The %ATT in Table 5 is defined as

Embedded Image [19]

Note that the ATT is equal to E[Y1D = 1] − E[Y0D = 1], which therefore has an upper bound of E [ Y1D = 1]. The %ATT can be interpreted as the percentage of the observed conservation practices for enrolled farmers that can be attributed to the treatment effect. The %ATT is thus equal to the percent additionality.

The overall ATT is positive and statistically significant for all six practices (Table 5). That is, the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals on ATT for each of the six practice types do not contain zero. This suggests that enrollment in cost-share programs achieves a significantly positive level of additionality for each practice type. The ATT values in Table 5 are higher for field practices than those for environmentally sensitive areas. This is not surprising because filter strips and grass waterways are solely focused along stream banks and in natural drainage areas and, thus, represent a smaller proportion of the total farm acreage. Recall that the proportion of conservation acreage adopted by enrolled farmers is less than 0.02 for both filter strips and grass waterways (Table 1).

To compare the level of additionality between practice types, we use the %ATT in equation [19]. The largest %ATT is found for hayfield establishment, cover crops, and filter strips with 93.3%, 90.6%, and 88.9%, respectively (Table 5). Moderate percent additionality was found for grid sampling and grass waterways with %ATT at 65.8% and 61.1%, respectively. Conservation tillage had the lowest percent additionality at only 19.3%. In sum, this suggests that while cost-share funding from enrollment in conservation programs achieves a positive ATT for all practice types, certain practice types achieve higher percent additionality than others.

To test whether the %ATT values are statistically different across practice types, we construct bootstrapped confidence intervals of the difference in %ATT for all pairwise combinations of practice types (Table 6). For example, the difference in %ATT between cover crops relative to conservation tillage has a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval spanning lower and upper bounds of 61.6% to 81.1%, respectively. This indicates that cover crops have a much higher %ATT than conservation tillage. Meanwhile, the difference in %ATT between cover crops and hayfield establishment is not statistically significant from zero because the bootstrapped confidence interval spans from - 10.3% to 13.2%. When comparing the two practice types for environmentally sensitive areas, filter strips have a statistically larger %ATT than grass waterways.

Table 6

Bootstrapped 95% Confidence Intervals for Pairwise Differences in %ATT using Propensity Score Kernel Matching (Kernel Type: Gaussian. Bandwidth = 0.06; Row Minus Column)

The components of the decomposed ATT show the relative contributions of new adopters and voluntary adopters to the overall ATT, which, in turn, explains the differences in %ATT between practice types. Table 5 highlights that ATTv is less than ATTn for all practice types, as expected. Interestingly, ATTv is positive but not statistically different from zero for all practices except for grid sampling. This result indicates that those farmers who would have adopted the practice without funding typically do not significantly expand their conservation acreage when receiving cost-share funding, with the exception of grid sampling. This could potentially reflect lumpy technology with fixed costs for expanding the adoption of conservation practices.

Practices for which a large fraction of enrolled farmers are voluntary adopters (i.e., Pv is large) typically have a lower %ATT. Consider conservation tillage where ATTn is 0.73, whileATTv is only 0.06. The estimated fraction of enrolled farmers for conservation tillage that are voluntary adopters, Pv = 0.86, is much larger than that of new adopters, Pn = 0.14. Consequently, the overall ATT is small relative to the total proportion of conservation acreage adopted, and thus, the %ATT is relatively low for conservation tillage.

In general, practices where Pn is considerably larger than Pv have higher %ATT values. When comparing the two environmentally sensitive practice types, the fraction of enrolled farmers who are new adopters for filter strips is Pn = 0.83, while for grass waterways Pn = 0.53 (Table 5). This is the principal reason why the %ATT is larger for filters strips (88.9%) than for grass waterways (61.1%). Similarly, when comparing the four field practices, cover crops and hayfield establishment have larger Pn values than either grid sampling or conservation tillage. As such, the %ATT values for cover crops (90.6%) and hayfield establishment (93.3%) exceed that of either grid sampling (65.8%) or conservation tillage (19.3%).

The heterogeneity in Pv and Pn, and consequently in %ATT, may in part be related to differences in the onsite net benefits to the farmer provided by the different practice types. Higher onsite net benefits should increase the likelihood that a farmer would adopt a practice even without funding, increasing the proportion of voluntary adopters for this practice type. Consider a comparison of the two environmentally sensitive practice types. Filter strips are typically located along stream banks and, therefore, mainly provide offsite benefits in terms of improved water quality by reducing nutrients and sediments from entering downstream water bodies. Grass waterways, in contrast, are typically installed in natural drainage areas within cultivated lands, which provides both onsite and offsite benefits. The results in Table 5, showing that Pn and %ATT are higher for filter strips than grass waterways, coincide with the expectation that farmers would be less likely to adopt filter strips without cost-share funding.

When evaluating whether to adopt a conservation field practice, farmers typically consider the impact such a practice would have on factors such as crop yields and operating costs. Hayfield establishment, for instance, would result in a complete loss in grain crop yields for the length of the enrollment contract. Meanwhile, conservation tillage often results in only modest changes in yields and may even lower operating costs, stemming from reduced fuel consumption. The results in Table 5, showing that %ATT is higher for hayfield establishment than conservation tillage, are consistent with the expectation that there are higher opportunity costs from losses in yield for hayfield establishment than for conservation tillage.

It is interesting to note that many farmers choose to self-fund the adoption of practices. In fact, Table 1 shows that adoption without enrollment (i.e., self-funded practices) is more common than adoption with enrollment for most practices. Some reasons for self-funding include government contract restrictions, such as engineering specification on practices or continuous adoption for entire contract period, which farmers may not want to comply with. Other reasons include government eligibility restrictions, such as “redlining,” where the farmer does not have the cropping history needed to qualify for the cost-share program. Transaction costs (e.g., paperwork) and attitudes to the government also make some farmers reluctant to participate in these programs. Additional quantitative and qualitative research is needed to understand the underlying reasons for self-funding, since increasing additionality is essentially an attempt to understand why farmers would adopt without funding.

Robustness Checks

As a robustness check to the estimation results presented in Table 5, we estimate the ATT, %ATT, and the decomposed effects using a variety of matching estimators that differ in the model specifications on the weights. Specifically, we conduct sensitivity analysis on the estimation results for all combinations of the following specifications: two matching methods (kernel and local linear), two kernel functions (Gaussian and Epanechnikov), and four bandwidths (bandwidths = 0.02, 0.06, 0.1, and 0.15).11 This yields a total of 16 different model specifications. The various model specifications provide a trade-off between bias and variance. For instance, smaller (larger) bandwidth typically results in lower (higher) bias because it provides weight to controls that are higher-quality matches, but higher (lower) variance because less information is used to construct the counterfactual for each enrolled farmer.

The main results in Table 5 are generally robust across all the model specifications.12 First, the overall ATT is positive and significant for each practice type across all 16 model specifications. Second, the %ATT for each practice is similar in magnitude to the results in Table 5 across all model specifications, varying generally by less than 5%. The %ATT results also maintain the same ordering for three groups of practices. Third, the ATTv is not statistically significant for hayfield establishment, filter strips, cover crops, and grass waterways for all 16 model specifications and was significant only for 2 and 4 of the 16 model specifications, for conservation tillage and grid sampling, respectively.

It should be acknowledged that there is the potential for farmer adoption and enrollment decisions to be correlated across practices, which could lead to biased estimates. Hence, we examine the sensitivity to the potential influence of cross-practice correlation for the field practices (conservation tillage, cover crops, hayfields, and grid sampling) and the environmentally sensitive practices (filter strips and grass waterways). To do so, we first limited the set of farmers in the control group for matching to only those farmers that did not receive cost-share funding for any field practice. We then reestimated the ATT, %ATT, and the decomposed components for each field practice using the limited set of controls. The same procedure was used for the two environmentally sensitive practices, where sets of farmers in the control group were only those farmers that did not receive cost-share funding for any environmentally sensitive practice. In general, when comparing the estimation results for each practice based on the limited set of controls with those in Table 5, we find that qualitatively the main findings remain largely unchanged. The only minor exception is that ATTv is statistically significant for grid sampling in Table 5, but it is no longer significant in the estimation with the limited set of controls.13 Hence, this suggests that at least for this study, the issue of correlation is unlikely to be a major concern.

Another issue that merits further analysis is whether additionality for a given practice varies significantly between programs. Of particular concern is the CSP, which specifically allows funding for both new and existing practices, thereby potentially resulting in lower levels of additionality relative to other programs. As a robustness check, we performed bootstrapped simulations to test whether the estimation results on %ATT differ significantly based on pairwise comparisons across the three largest programs (EQIP, CRP, and CSP). We restrict our analysis to only those pairwise comparisons that have greater than 10 enrolled farmers in each program for the given practice (Table 2). Table 7 provides the estimated %ATT for each of the programs for conservation tillage, grid sampling, grass waterways, and filter strips. The other two practices were not included in Table 7 because the number of enrolled farmers was insufficient to perform program-level comparisons. Estimation results in Table 7 indicate that the %ATT does not differ significantly between programs for all practices since the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals contain zero for all pairwise program-level comparisons. For this reason, we maintained our focus on the additionality estimation results for enrollment in all programs (i.e., receiving any cost-share funding versus no funding). Nonetheless, the results in Table 7 depend on a relatively small sample of enrolled farmers in each program, and therefore program-level differences in additionality are an important issue for future study. Similarly, it would be informative to assess subgroup heterogeneity of the treatment effect based on farm-level variation in covariates. This would require splitting the sample into subgroups based on some chosen set of covariates to perform this disaggregated analysis of the ATT for each subgroup. This is another issue for future research that would benefit from a larger sample size, similar to the analysis on program-level heterogeneity in Table 7.

Table 7

Program-Level %ATT and Bootstrapped Confidence Intervals of the Pairwise Program-Level Differences in %ATT using Propensity Score Kernel Matching (Kernel Type: Gaussian, Bandwidth = 0.06)

Slippage is another issue to consider since conservation programs have been previously found to induce slippage, which can offset the additionality benefits provided by such programs (Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez 2011). We also examine whether enrollment in conservation programs induces slippage, using our survey data on the proportion of the property in “other uses,” which includes woodland, wildlife habitat, and buildings. When estimating the ATT on this outcome variable, a decrease in the proportion in other uses would be indicative of slippage since there is a decrease in the land dedicated to nonfarm uses. The estimated ATT on other uses was negative (–0.0124), indicating that enrolled farmers had on average about 1.2% less land in other uses; however, this result was not significantly different from zero at the 95% level. Hence, unlike Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez (2011), we did not find significant evidence of slippage in our study region.

It should be acknowledged that estimation of the ATT using propensity score matching is based on the unconfoundedness assumption. If there exist unobserved covariates that influence both enrollment and outcome variables, then the estimated ATT may be biased. For example, unobserved characteristics may explain why some farmers choose to voluntarily adopt conservation practice even when funding is available. Although the unconfoundedness assumption cannot be verified in practice, Rosenbaum (2002) developed a method to test the extent to which a matching estimator is sensitive to hidden bias. Specifically, Rosenbaum's approach assumes that the propensity score, P(D =1⎪ X ), is influenced not only by observed covariates X, but also by an unobserved covariate. As a result of this unobserved covariate, farmers that are matched based on similar propensity score values, may actually differ in their odds of enrolling by a factor of Γ, where Γ = 1 represents the baseline case of no hidden bias. The higher the level of Γ to which the ATT remains statistically different from zero, the more robust are the estimation results to the potential influence of hidden bias.

We conduct a Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis to estimate the extent to which selection on unobservables may bias the estimates of the ATT (Rosenbaum 2002; DiPrete and Gangl 2004). Using this approach, which relies on a signed rank test, we determine the upper bounds on the significance level (i.e., critical p-values) of the ATT for different levels of hidden bias in terms of Γ. Estimation results from the Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis are provided in Table 8. The first column provides the Γ values, and the second column (sig + ) provides the corresponding upper bound on the p-value for the ATT. The filter strips practice is the most robust to the potential presence of hidden bias, where the estimated ATT remains statistically different from zero at the 5% level for a critical threshold Γ value at 10.2. Conservation tillage, on the other hand, is the least robust to hidden bias, where the critical Γ value is 1.24. The other practice types have moderate to high critical Γ values ranging from 2.2 for cover crops to 5 for grid sampling.

Table 8

Results for Rosenbaum Bounds Sensitivity Analysis

V. Conclusions

Federal cost-share funding for the adoption of conservation practices on working lands have increased considerably since 2002. The efficiency of cost-share programs depends in part on the degree to which the programs provide additional conservation effort. In this paper, we use propensity score matching to estimate the level of additionality from enrollment in cost-share programs for six conservation practices. Our results indicate that enrollment achieves positive and significant levels of additionality for each of the six practice types. That being said, the percent additionality varies dramatically between practice types. Specifically, the percent additionality is highest for hayfield establishment (93.3%), cover crops (90.6%), and filter strips (88.9%), while it is lowest for conservation tillage (19.3%).

Our decomposition of the ATT into the relative contributions of voluntary adopters and new adopters provides several policy insights. First, the ATT for voluntary adopters was not significant for all practice types, except for grid sampling, suggesting that program enrollment is generally not inducing significant management changes for farmers who would have used a practice even in the absence of cost-share funding. Second, decomposition estimates suggest that the differences in %ATT between practice types are mainly determined by the fraction of enrolled farmers who are voluntary adopters versus new adopters. Practice types that have a large fraction of new adopters, such as filter strips and hayfield establishment, exhibit larger values for %ATT. Lastly, this novel methodological approach to decompose ATT is broadly applicable for program evaluation in other contexts where program participants can be categorized into distinct groups.

Our results on additionality are interesting to compare to related findings of Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez (2011). These authors also find that cost-share funding has a positive impact on the proportion of land adopted in conservation practices for all practices. They interpret this result as a suggestion that adverse selection problems were not very prevalent (if present at all). These findings are basically a test of the hypothesis that ATT is significantly different from zero, which we also find for all practices. The advantage of our %ATT metric, which to our knowledge is new to the literature, is that the treatment effect is normalized by the observed amount of conservation practice for enrolled farmers. In other words, it is helpful to know that ATT (or %ATT) is positive and significantly different from zero for all practices, which means the funds are not entirely wasted. However, it provides further information to policy makers to understand the percentage increases in the observed conservation practices that are attributable to enrollment, and that this %ATT can actually vary widely across the different practice types.

There are a number of issues that deserve future attention. First, the results on additionality represent only the farmer's decisions on changes in land cover or management activities, but they do not necessarily correspond directly to environmental benefits. Additionality as measured in this study is only one essential component needed for a more complete program evaluation that includes the environmental benefits, monetary costs allocated to farmers for cost share, and other factors (e.g., slippage, leakage). For instance, targeting funding toward a practice with low levels of additionality may be efficient if that practice has high environmental benefits or would be adopted with relatively low costshare payment. Second, the geographic scope of our analysis is limited to farmers in southwestern Ohio. For example, the low %ATT for conservation tillage in our region needs further analysis with data from other regions. Third, our analysis focused on enrollment from any cost-share program versus not receiving funding. We did attempt to assess whether the ATT differed between programs (Table 7) but did not find any significant program heterogeneity, presumably due to a limited sample size. Hence, further analysis is needed to examine program heterogeneity in additionality and the role of program design criteria. Likewise, further analysis would be desirable to assess subgroup heterogeneity in additionality based on farm-level covariates, to improve program design. This issue has been emphasized in prior studies by Horowitz and Just (2011) and Mason and Plantinga (2011).

In conclusion, the practice of offering payment incentives to landowners to improve environmental stewardship is growing in popularity. Emerging markets for ecosystem services are being developed that offer payments to landowners to enhance carbon sequestration and water quality via the adoption of agricultural conservation practices. Additionality is a major concern in such programs because it is an essential element of program effectiveness. As the implementation of incentive-based programs increases to address environmental concerns, analysis of existing programs is crucial to determine how much these programs induce increases in conservation effort. This study helps meet that need by measuring additionality for incentive-based programs and providing a new approach that decomposes additionality into the relative contributions of voluntary adopters and new adopters.

Acknowledgments

This article was developed with support of a USDA-ERS Cooperative Agreement 58-6000-0-0052 and STAR Research Assistance Agreement No. RD- 83367401-0 awarded by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. It has not been formally reviewed by ERS or EPA and the views expressed in this document are solely those of the authors. The author's views represent his opinion and do not represent the opinions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or the Commissioner. The research also benefited from Texas AgriLife Research with support from the Cooperative State Research, Education & Extension Service, Hatch Project TEX8604.We acknowledge many helpful discussions with Roger Claassen, Dusty Hall, Sarah Hippensteel, John Horowitz, Ximing Wu, and soil and water conservation district agents and farmers in Ohio. Brent Sohngen and Jim Ramey were particularly helpful and provided invaluable assistance in the implementation of the survey.1. In addition to kernel and local linear matching, nearest-neighbor matching is another commonly used model specification. However, Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2008) explain that bootstrapped standard errors are not valid for nearest-neighbor matching with a fixed number of neighbors, and further explain that kernel-based matching for which the number of matches increases with sample size has estimators that are asymptotically linear, and thus the bootstrap is expected to provide valid inference. For this reason, we focus on the kernel and local linear matching estimators.

APPENDIX Validation of the Estimators for the Decomposition of the ATT

Here we demonstrate that when the proposed estimators for the decomposed parts in equations [11], [12], [16], and [17] are substituted into equation [8], this yields the same expression as the estimator for the overall ATT shown in equation [4]. To begin, we substitute the estimators on the four decomposed parts from equations [11], [12], [16], and [17] into equation [8]:

Embedded Image [20]

After using equation [11] and cancelling terms, equation [20] can be rewritten as

Embedded Image [21]

The first term in brackets in equation [21] reduces to the matching estimator for E [ Y1D = 1] in [3]. Thus, equation [21] yields

Embedded Image [22]

which equals the matching estimator for the overall ATT in equation [4].

Footnotes

  • The authors are, respectively, economist, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.; assistant professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland, College Park; and professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station.

  • 1 The expression Embedded Image denotes the empirical estimate of Embedded Image Refer to Smith and Todd (2005) for further clarification of this expression.

  • 2 Equation [15] can be equivalently expressed as Embedded Image. Note that Embedded Image is in the numerator of equation [15] because Embedded Image when Embedded Image when Embedded Image

  • 3 With the continuous sign-up CRP, “landowners and operators with eligible lands may enroll certain high priority conservation practices, such as filter strips and riparian buffers, at any time during the year without competition” (USDA FSA 2008).

  • 4 Farmers that reported a proportion of adopted conservation acreage greater than one for field practices and greater than 0.2 for environmentally sensitive practices were dropped because they were considered inaccurate survey responses.

  • 5 Conservation programs, such as EQIP, often have budget constraints that limit the number of applicants who receive funding. Additionality estimation results would likely change if a program had an unlimited budget, since it would alter the sample of enrolled farmers (treatment) and nonenrolled farmers (control). Hence, the estimation results from our study must be interpreted as estimates of additionality for programs as they existed with budget constraints.

  • 6 Some farmers reported receiving funding from more than one program for the same practice. For example, a farmer could receive EQIP funding for a filter strip on one field, and CRP funding for a filter strip on another field.

  • 7 Summary statistics of the covariates and the estimated probit coefficients (analogous to Tables 3 and 4) for the other five practice types are available upon request.

  • 8 Refer to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for information on the covariate balancing test using a two-group t -test.

  • 9 We impose two common support conditions in Stata to reduce poor-quality matches. First, we used the common support condition that drops enrolled farmers whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of the nonenrolled farmers (control group). Second, we used the 2% trimming condition that drops 2% of the enrolled farmers where the propensity score density of the control observations is the lowest.

  • 10 The bootstrapping procedure used 1,000 random draws from the data set of farmers, with replacement and using the same number of farmers in each draw equal to the number in the original data set. The 95% bootstrapped confidence interval consists of the 26th-and 975th-largest parameter estimates.

  • 11 In addition to kernel and local linear matching, nearest-neighbor matching is another commonly used model specification. However, Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2008) explain that bootstrapped standard errors are not valid for nearest-neighbor matching with a fixed number of neighbors, and further explain that kernel-based matching for which the number of matches increases with sample size has estimators that are asymptotically linear, and thus the bootstrap is expected to provide valid inference. For this reason, we focus on the kernel and local linear matching estimators.

  • 12 Estimation results analogous to those in Table 5 for the other 15 model specifications are available upon request.

  • 13 Estimation results for the ATT, %ATT, and the decomposed components using the limited set of controls are available upon request.

References