Open Access

Tenant Favoritism and Right of First Refusals in Farmland Auctions

Competition and Price Effects

Lars Isenhardt, Stefan Seifert and Silke Hüttel

Article Figures & Data

  • Table 1

    Descriptive Statistics of LGSA and BVVG Land Auctions, 2007-2018

    Seller: LGSA (926 Transactions)Seller: BVVG (2,973 Transactions)
    MeanMed.SDQ01Q99MeanMed.SDQ01Q99
    Lot Characteristics
    Lot size (ha)  7.38  8.34  3.21  0.19  13.33  4.92  3.42  4.84  0.07  20.83
    Soil quality (index)67.2371.0021.4622.93  99.0050.2346.0020.5018.17  97.00
    Share of arable land (%)86.89  98.224.59  0.00100.0068.9991.6039.30  0.00100.00
    Share of grassland (%)10.02  0.0023.17  0.00100.0024.99  0.0037.46  0.00100.00
    Share of other land (%)  3.09  0.00  6.73  0.00  34.45  6.03  0.5010.69  0.00  47.33
    Auction Characteristics
    Number of bids (count)  4.52  4.00  2.36  1.0012.75  4.22  4.00  2.41  2.0013.00
    Winning bid (€/m2)  1.88  1.73  1.19  0.27  4.70  1.45  1.17  0.98  0.26  4.41
    Right Holder
    Submitted bid (0/1)  0.73  1.00  0.44  0.00  1.00
    Exercised RFR (0/1)  0.59  1.00  0.49  0.00  1.00
    Won by own bid (0/1)  0.11  0.00  0.32  0.00  1.00
    Rejected RFR (0/1)  0.30  0.00  0.46  0.00  1.00
    • Note: Due to data privacy regulations, the table does not include information about the minima or maxima. RFR, right of first refusal.

  • Table 2

    Postmatching Regression Results

    [3a]
    ln(n-1)
    [3b]
    ln(nnRH-1)
    [5a]
    log(p)
    [5b]
    log(p)
    [5c]
    log(p)
    Intercept0.232** (0.112)−0.003 (0.136)
    Hedonic Characteristics
    Soil quality0.009*** (0.001)0.011*** (0.001)0.013*** (0.001)0.013*** (0.001)0.013*** (0.001)
    Lot size20.002*** (0.000)0.002*** (0.000)0.001*** (0.000)0.001*** (0.000)0.001*** (0.000)
    Share grassland−0.003*** (0.001)−0.004*** (0.001)−0.007*** (0.001)−0.007*** (0.001)−0.007*** (0.001)
    Share other land−0.017*** (0.003)−0.019*** (0.003)−0.010*** (0.002)−0.010*** (0.002)−0.010*** (0.002)
    Participant Class
    No. participants: 2−1.215*** (0.050)−1.207*** (0.055)−1.170*** (0.049)
    No. participants: 3−1.139*** (0.050)−1.086*** (0.054)−1.112*** (0.048)
    No. participants: 4−1.125*** (0.052)−1.074*** (0.057)−1.113*** (0.049)
    No. participants: 5−1.047*** (0.053)−1.030*** (0.057)−1.041*** (0.050)
    No. participants: 6–8−0.998*** (0.053)−1.032*** (0.053)−0.998*** (0.050)
    No. participants: 9+−0.970*** (0.056)−1.021*** (0.057)−0.968*** (0.054)
    Tenant Support Effects with RFR
    LGSA−0.093** (0.041)−0.338*** (0.043)−0.164*** (0.017)
    LGSA: no. participants: 2−0.159*** (0.045)
    LGSA: no. participants: 3−0.233*** (0.030)
    LGSA: no. participants: 4−0.224*** (0.036)
    LGSA: no. participants: 5−0.173*** (0.036)
    LGSA: no. participants: 6–8−0.092*** (0.029)
    LGSA: no. participants: 9+−0.039       (0.032)
    LGSA: tenant exercised RFR−0.168*** (0.018)
    LGSA: tenant won by own bid−0.382*** (0.030)
    LGSA: tenant rejected RFR−0.056*** (0.019)
    WeightsYesYesYesYesYes
    Treated observations926929926926926
    Control observations590590590590590
    Pseudo R-squared/R-squared0.2920.3260.8740.8760.876
    θ14.104 (2.214)8.143 (1.003)
    • Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses (White 1980). Parameter estimates for county and year dummy variables are reported in Appendix B. For [3a] and [3b], the pseudo R-squared is specified as the squared correlation coefficient between observed and fitted values. RFR, right of first refusal.

    • *p = < 0.1; **p = < 0.05; ***p = < 0.01.