Regulating the commons: The interplay between information and catch limits with two types of resources

Trevor C. Collier, Nancy Haskell and Aaron Mamula

Abstract

Empirically identifying effective resource management strategies proves challenging with many concurrent regulations. We focus on two common regulations within a spatial common pool resource experiment that involves the extraction of two different types of resources. Pooled or individual-specific limits regulate harvest of a protected resource, which co-locates with the desirable resource. The experiment design mimics the extraction of target species and protected bycatch in commercial fisheries. We find three key results, absent other regulations. Desirable resource harvests are lower under pooled than individual limits; information sharing increases desirable resource harvests with individual limits, but exacerbates moral hazard under pooled limits.

Key wordsJEL Codes

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