RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Pure Public Goods versus Commons: Benefit-Cost Duality
JF Land Economics
JO Land Econ
FD University of Wisconsin Press
SP 355
OP 368
DO 10.2307/3147022
VO 79
IS 3
A1 Sandler, Todd
A1 Arce M., Daniel G.
YR 2003
UL http://le.uwpress.org/content/79/3/355.abstract
AB This paper utilizes benefit-cost duality to differentiate the problems associated with a pure public good from the problems associated with a commons. For the public good scenario, contributors’ benefits are public or available to all, while provision costs impact only the contributor. In a commons, crowding costs are public, while benefits affect only the user. Although both problems possess the same game form for their canonical representations, collective-action implications differ: for example, the relative positions of the Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimum, the form of the exploitation hypothesis, and the need for selective incentives or punishments. (JEL H41, D70)