RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Equilibrium Behavior in the Conservation Easement Game
JF Land Economics
JO Land Econ
FD University of Wisconsin Press
SP 355
OP 374
DO 10.2307/3654726
VO 80
IS 3
A1 Anderson, Christopher M.
A1 King, Jonathan R.
YR 2004
UL http://le.uwpress.org/content/80/3/355.abstract
AB Conservation easements allow landowners to collect earnings from their land, while reducing their tax burdens because the land cannot be sold into development. Conservation assures open space amenities for nearby residents, however, the residents bear a tax increase that offsets the owner’s tax reduction. We develop a game-theoretic model of the private monetary incentives induced by conservation easement programs, and use an experiment to verify that conservation decisions are made based on private incentives and without consideration of the public goods conservation provides. This implies that, unless land trusts are discriminating, conservation easements need not lead to optimal conservation, and may even reduce social welfare. (JEL Q20, Q24)