<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><xml><records><record><source-app name="HighWire" version="7.x">Drupal-HighWire</source-app><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sumaila, Ussif Rashid</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Armstrong, Claire W.</style></author></authors><secondary-authors></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Distributional and Efficiency Effects of Marine Protected Areas: A Study of the Northeast Atlantic Cod Fishery</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Land Economics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006-08-01 00:00:00</style></date></pub-dates></dates><pages><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">321-332</style></pages><doi><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10.3368/le.82.3.321</style></doi><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">82</style></volume><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><abstract><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">We study the distributional and efficiency effects of marine protected areas using the Northeast Atlantic cod stock as an example. A model with two players targeting different age groups of cod is developed to examine how protected areas may affect payoffs to the players under cooperation and non-cooperation. We find that depending on the ex ante and ex post management regime, win-win, lose-lose, or win-lose outcomes may emerge with the implementation of marine protected areas. When the ex post management is cooperation, both players gain, while ex post non-cooperative behavior results in gains only to one of the players. (JEL Q22, Q28)</style></abstract></record></records></xml>