<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><xml><records><record><source-app name="HighWire" version="7.x">Drupal-HighWire</source-app><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anderson, Christopher M.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Holland, Daniel S.</style></author></authors><secondary-authors></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Auctions for Initial Sale of Annual Catch Entitlement</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Land Economics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006-08-01 00:00:00</style></date></pub-dates></dates><pages><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">333-352</style></pages><doi><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10.3368/le.82.3.333</style></doi><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">82</style></volume><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><abstract><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">We use a laboratory experiment, calibrated to a representative New Zealand fishery, to assess three sealed-bid, multi-unit demand auction mechanisms under consideration for allocating quota for species being introduced into the Quota Management System. These auctions allocate the K units to the K highest bids, but prices are determined according to discriminative, Kth price, and K + 1st price rules. In our experiment, the auctions are equally efficient, but revenue is highest in the discriminative auction, and lowest in the K + 1st price auction. Results are robust to industry subjects, and subjects are responsive to the across-unit bidding incentives present in multi-unit demand auctions. (JEL Q22)</style></abstract></record></records></xml>