PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - Anderson, Christopher M.
AU  - Holland, Daniel S.
TI  - Auctions for Initial Sale of Annual Catch Entitlement
AID  - 10.3368/le.82.3.333
DP  - 2006 Aug 01
TA  - Land Economics
PG  - 333--352
VI  - 82
IP  - 3
4099  - http://le.uwpress.org/content/82/3/333.short
4100  - http://le.uwpress.org/content/82/3/333.full
SO  - Land Econ2006 Aug 01; 82
AB  - We use a laboratory experiment, calibrated to a representative New Zealand fishery, to assess three sealed-bid, multi-unit demand auction mechanisms under consideration for allocating quota for species being introduced into the Quota Management System. These auctions allocate the K units to the K highest bids, but prices are determined according to discriminative, Kth price, and K + 1st price rules. In our experiment, the auctions are equally efficient, but revenue is highest in the discriminative auction, and lowest in the K + 1st price auction. Results are robust to industry subjects, and subjects are responsive to the across-unit bidding incentives present in multi-unit demand auctions. (JEL Q22)