RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Auctions for Initial Sale of Annual Catch Entitlement
JF Land Economics
JO Land Econ
FD University of Wisconsin Press
SP 333
OP 352
DO 10.3368/le.82.3.333
VO 82
IS 3
A1 Anderson, Christopher M.
A1 Holland, Daniel S.
YR 2006
UL http://le.uwpress.org/content/82/3/333.abstract
AB We use a laboratory experiment, calibrated to a representative New Zealand fishery, to assess three sealed-bid, multi-unit demand auction mechanisms under consideration for allocating quota for species being introduced into the Quota Management System. These auctions allocate the K units to the K highest bids, but prices are determined according to discriminative, Kth price, and K + 1st price rules. In our experiment, the auctions are equally efficient, but revenue is highest in the discriminative auction, and lowest in the K + 1st price auction. Results are robust to industry subjects, and subjects are responsive to the across-unit bidding incentives present in multi-unit demand auctions. (JEL Q22)