PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - Angelsen, Arild
ED  - Barbier, Edward B.
ED  - Burgess, Joanne C.
TI  - Playing Games in the Forest: State-Local Conflicts of Land Appropriation
AID  - 10.2307/3147095
DP  - 2001 May 01
TA  - Land Economics
PG  - 285--299
VI  - 77
IP  - 2
4099  - http://le.uwpress.org/content/77/2/285.short
4100  - http://le.uwpress.org/content/77/2/285.full
SO  - Land Econ2001 May 01; 77
AB  - This paper explores possible strategic interactions between the state and local community in games of tropical forestland appropriation. Three typical cases are discussed, corresponding to a development over time of increased resource competition and market integration. The local response to more state deforestation depends on the costs, market, and behavioral assumptions, and less on the structure of the game (Cournot or Stackelberg). The state fuels local deforestation by providing infrastructure (roads) which reduces the net costs of agricultural expansion, or when markets are imperfect and local behavior determined by survival needs. The game structure is, however, important for total deforestation. (JEL O13, Q15, Q23)