RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Playing Games in the Forest: State-Local Conflicts of Land Appropriation
JF Land Economics
JO Land Econ
FD University of Wisconsin Press
SP 285
OP 299
DO 10.2307/3147095
VO 77
IS 2
A1 Angelsen, Arild
A1 Barbier, Edward B.
A1 Burgess, Joanne C.
YR 2001
UL http://le.uwpress.org/content/77/2/285.abstract
AB This paper explores possible strategic interactions between the state and local community in games of tropical forestland appropriation. Three typical cases are discussed, corresponding to a development over time of increased resource competition and market integration. The local response to more state deforestation depends on the costs, market, and behavioral assumptions, and less on the structure of the game (Cournot or Stackelberg). The state fuels local deforestation by providing infrastructure (roads) which reduces the net costs of agricultural expansion, or when markets are imperfect and local behavior determined by survival needs. The game structure is, however, important for total deforestation. (JEL O13, Q15, Q23)