PT - JOURNAL ARTICLE AU - Anne Borge Johannesen AU - Anders Skonhoft TI - Local Common Property Exploitation with Rewards AID - 10.3368/le.85.4.637 DP - 2009 Nov 01 TA - Land Economics PG - 637--654 VI - 85 IP - 4 4099 - http://le.uwpress.org/content/85/4/637.short 4100 - http://le.uwpress.org/content/85/4/637.full SO - Land Econ2009 Nov 01; 85 AB - This paper analyzes coalition formation in a livestock-pasture system where livestock are privately owned and the pasture is a common property. While standard models predict rather low prospects of cooperation, this paper introduces a cost advantage of cooperation based on Saami reindeer herding that may explain higher coalition participation. In contrast to the existing fishery literature on coalition formation, all players are assumed ex ante homogenous but may differ ex post due to the cost advantage. A stable equilibrium with cooperation can be reached and a moderate exploitation level can be sustained compared to the “tragedy of the commons” outcome. (JEL Q24)