TY - JOUR T1 - Local Common Property Exploitation with Rewards JF - Land Economics JO - Land Econ SP - 637 LP - 654 DO - 10.3368/le.85.4.637 VL - 85 IS - 4 AU - Anne Borge Johannesen AU - Anders Skonhoft Y1 - 2009/11/01 UR - http://le.uwpress.org/content/85/4/637.abstract N2 - This paper analyzes coalition formation in a livestock-pasture system where livestock are privately owned and the pasture is a common property. While standard models predict rather low prospects of cooperation, this paper introduces a cost advantage of cooperation based on Saami reindeer herding that may explain higher coalition participation. In contrast to the existing fishery literature on coalition formation, all players are assumed ex ante homogenous but may differ ex post due to the cost advantage. A stable equilibrium with cooperation can be reached and a moderate exploitation level can be sustained compared to the “tragedy of the commons” outcome. (JEL Q24) ER -