PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - Ann L. Brower
AU  - Philip Meguire
AU  - Adrian Monks
TI  - Closing the Deal: Principals, Agents, and Subagents in New Zealand Land Reform
AID  - 10.3368/le.86.3.467
DP  - 2010 Aug 01
TA  - Land Economics
PG  - 467--492
VI  - 86
IP  - 3
4099  - http://le.uwpress.org/content/86/3/467.short
4100  - http://le.uwpress.org/content/86/3/467.full
SO  - Land Econ2010 Aug 01; 86
AB  - This paper uses bargaining dynamics, administrative politics, and agency theory to examine financial outcomes from New Zealand land reform. Results are inconsistent with payments arising from a bargain in which both the Crown and lessee advocate to their full potential, and are instead consistent with the Crown backing down to lessees’ desires for a generous deal. This back-down stems either from “bureaucratic coping,” or from the addition of a bureaucratic middleman between the Crown principal and its negotiator subagent, exacerbating the principal-agent problem. (JEL K11, Q28)