TY - JOUR T1 - Closing the Deal: Principals, Agents, and Subagents in New Zealand Land Reform JF - Land Economics JO - Land Econ SP - 467 LP - 492 DO - 10.3368/le.86.3.467 VL - 86 IS - 3 AU - Ann L. Brower AU - Philip Meguire AU - Adrian Monks Y1 - 2010/08/01 UR - http://le.uwpress.org/content/86/3/467.abstract N2 - This paper uses bargaining dynamics, administrative politics, and agency theory to examine financial outcomes from New Zealand land reform. Results are inconsistent with payments arising from a bargain in which both the Crown and lessee advocate to their full potential, and are instead consistent with the Crown backing down to lessees’ desires for a generous deal. This back-down stems either from “bureaucratic coping,” or from the addition of a bureaucratic middleman between the Crown principal and its negotiator subagent, exacerbating the principal-agent problem. (JEL K11, Q28) ER -