RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Closing the Deal: Principals, Agents, and Subagents in New Zealand Land Reform
JF Land Economics
JO Land Econ
FD University of Wisconsin Press
SP 467
OP 492
DO 10.3368/le.86.3.467
VO 86
IS 3
A1 Ann L. Brower
A1 Philip Meguire
A1 Adrian Monks
YR 2010
UL http://le.uwpress.org/content/86/3/467.abstract
AB This paper uses bargaining dynamics, administrative politics, and agency theory to examine financial outcomes from New Zealand land reform. Results are inconsistent with payments arising from a bargain in which both the Crown and lessee advocate to their full potential, and are instead consistent with the Crown backing down to lessees’ desires for a generous deal. This back-down stems either from “bureaucratic coping,” or from the addition of a bureaucratic middleman between the Crown principal and its negotiator subagent, exacerbating the principal-agent problem. (JEL K11, Q28)