RT Journal Article SR Electronic T1 Following the Rules: Brazilian Logging Concessions under Imperfect Enforcement and Royalties JF Land Economics JO Land Econ FD University of Wisconsin Press SP 493 OP 513 DO 10.3368/le.86.3.493 VO 86 IS 3 A1 Alexander J. Macpherson A1 Douglas R. Carter A1 Marco W. Lentini A1 Mark D. Schulze YR 2010 UL http://le.uwpress.org/content/86/3/493.abstract AB Debates about forest concessions in the Brazilian Amazon have focused on the government’s enforcement capacity. Using an optimization model largely parameterized with data from the Eastern Amazon, we investigate the effectiveness of renewability audits and performance bonds in inducing compliance with reduced-impact logging and harvest volume requirements. In weak enforcement environments, audits are unlikely to induce full compliance with harvest regulations, while performance bonds may be more effective. The use of royalty instruments such as the ad valorem and revenue-based royalties can generate revenues and, in the case of revenue-based instruments, modify harvest behavior, but only under limited circumstances. (JEL Q23, Q28)