PT - JOURNAL ARTICLE AU - Jan Tore Solstad AU - Kjell Arne Brekke TI - Does the Existence of a Public Good Enhance Cooperation among Users of Common-Pool Resources? AID - 10.3368/le.87.2.335 DP - 2011 May 01 TA - Land Economics PG - 335--345 VI - 87 IP - 2 4099 - http://le.uwpress.org/content/87/2/335.short 4100 - http://le.uwpress.org/content/87/2/335.full SO - Land Econ2011 May 01; 87 AB - Without resorting to the folk theorem or to altruistic preferences, we demonstrate that the problem of overharvesting among individually rational harvesters in a local commons vanishes if the harvesters share, and voluntarily contribute to, some public good. Formulating the model as a two-stage sequential game, the harvesting of a renewable natural resource takes place at the first stage. The observed harvesting surplus is then used for buying private goods and contributing to public goods at the second stage. In this setting, the model shows that the harvesters share an individual objective of maximizing total harvesting surplus. (JEL H41)