<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><xml><records><record><source-app name="HighWire" version="7.x">Drupal-HighWire</source-app><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ito, Junichi</style></author></authors><secondary-authors></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Collective Action for Local Commons Management in Rural Yunnan, China: Empirical Evidence and Hypotheses Using Evolutionary Game Theory</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Land Economics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012-02-01 00:00:00</style></date></pub-dates></dates><pages><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">181-200</style></pages><doi><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10.3368/le.88.1.181</style></doi><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">88</style></volume><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><abstract><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This paper presents hypotheses regarding collective actions for irrigation management, with the help of evolutionary game theory. Data for the analysis were collected by the author from the irrigation system of rural Yunnan, China. An econometric analysis reveals that collective action will be forthcoming in rural communities where few nonfarm job opportunities are provided, the degree of income disparity is quite small, and resource restrictions are moderately problematic. The finding that communities without local government intervention outperform those with intervention supports the proverbial view that external agencies should delegate significant parts of the control rights of common pool resources to immediate stakeholders. (JEL O13, Q25)</style></abstract></record></records></xml>