PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - Ito, Junichi
TI  - Collective Action for Local Commons Management in Rural Yunnan, China: Empirical Evidence and Hypotheses Using Evolutionary Game Theory
AID  - 10.3368/le.88.1.181
DP  - 2012 Feb 01
TA  - Land Economics
PG  - 181--200
VI  - 88
IP  - 1
4099  - http://le.uwpress.org/content/88/1/181.short
4100  - http://le.uwpress.org/content/88/1/181.full
SO  - Land Econ2012 Feb 01; 88
AB  - This paper presents hypotheses regarding collective actions for irrigation management, with the help of evolutionary game theory. Data for the analysis were collected by the author from the irrigation system of rural Yunnan, China. An econometric analysis reveals that collective action will be forthcoming in rural communities where few nonfarm job opportunities are provided, the degree of income disparity is quite small, and resource restrictions are moderately problematic. The finding that communities without local government intervention outperform those with intervention supports the proverbial view that external agencies should delegate significant parts of the control rights of common pool resources to immediate stakeholders. (JEL O13, Q25)