RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Collective Action for Local Commons Management in Rural Yunnan, China: Empirical Evidence and Hypotheses Using Evolutionary Game Theory
JF Land Economics
JO Land Econ
FD University of Wisconsin Press
SP 181
OP 200
DO 10.3368/le.88.1.181
VO 88
IS 1
A1 Ito, Junichi
YR 2012
UL http://le.uwpress.org/content/88/1/181.abstract
AB This paper presents hypotheses regarding collective actions for irrigation management, with the help of evolutionary game theory. Data for the analysis were collected by the author from the irrigation system of rural Yunnan, China. An econometric analysis reveals that collective action will be forthcoming in rural communities where few nonfarm job opportunities are provided, the degree of income disparity is quite small, and resource restrictions are moderately problematic. The finding that communities without local government intervention outperform those with intervention supports the proverbial view that external agencies should delegate significant parts of the control rights of common pool resources to immediate stakeholders. (JEL O13, Q25)