<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><xml><records><record><source-app name="HighWire" version="7.x">Drupal-HighWire</source-app><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chankrajang, Thanyaporn</style></author></authors><secondary-authors></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Partial Land Rights and Agricultural Outcomes: Evidence from Thailand</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Land Economics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015-02-01 00:00:00</style></date></pub-dates></dates><pages><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">126-148</style></pages><doi><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10.3368/le.91.1.126</style></doi><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91</style></volume><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><abstract><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">To disentangle the issue concerning which dimensions of land rights, among security, tradability, and pledgeability, affect agricultural outcomes, this paper exploits a unique partial land rights entitlement program in Thailand that guarantees only security, allows a limited access to credit, and prohibits any land sale. Based on an instrumental variables strategy, I find that the entitlement increases (1) second-rice but not major-rice productivity, (2) land use intensity, and (3) land-related investment, and leads to (4) better soil quality. This suggests that the security dimension, alone, can play an important role in improving farm activities. (JEL O13, Q15)</style></abstract></record></records></xml>