PT - JOURNAL ARTICLE AU - Abbott, Joshua K. AU - Haynie, Alan C. AU - Reimer, Matthew N. TI - Hidden Flexibility: Institutions, Incentives, and the Margins of Selectivity in Fishing AID - 10.3368/le.91.1.169 DP - 2015 Feb 01 TA - Land Economics PG - 169--195 VI - 91 IP - 1 4099 - http://le.uwpress.org/content/91/1/169.short 4100 - http://le.uwpress.org/content/91/1/169.full SO - Land Econ2015 Feb 01; 91 AB - The degree to which selectivity in fisheries is malleable to changes in incentive structures is critical for policy design. We examine data for a multispecies trawl fishery before and after a transition from management under common-pool quotas to a fishery cooperative and note a substantial shift in postcooperative catch from bycatch and toward valuable target species. We examine the margins used to affect catch composition, finding that large- and fine-scale spatial decision making and avoidance of night-fishing were critical. We argue that the poor incentives for selectivity in many systems may obscure significant flexibility in multispecies production technologies. (JEL Q22, Q28)