PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - Joshua K. Abbott
AU  - Alan C. Haynie
AU  - Matthew N. Reimer
TI  - Hidden Flexibility: Institutions, Incentives, and the Margins of Selectivity in Fishing
AID  - 10.3368/le.91.1.169
DP  - 2015 Feb 01
TA  - Land Economics
PG  - 169--195
VI  - 91
IP  - 1
4099  - http://le.uwpress.org/content/91/1/169.short
4100  - http://le.uwpress.org/content/91/1/169.full
SO  - Land Econ2015 Feb 01; 91
AB  - The degree to which selectivity in fisheries is malleable to changes in incentive structures is critical for policy design. We examine data for a multispecies trawl fishery before and after a transition from management under common-pool quotas to a fishery cooperative and note a substantial shift in postcooperative catch from bycatch and toward valuable target species. We examine the margins used to affect catch composition, finding that large- and fine-scale spatial decision making and avoidance of night-fishing were critical. We argue that the poor incentives for selectivity in many systems may obscure significant flexibility in multispecies production technologies. (JEL Q22, Q28)