RT Journal Article SR Electronic T1 Hidden Flexibility: Institutions, Incentives, and the Margins of Selectivity in Fishing JF Land Economics JO Land Econ FD University of Wisconsin Press SP 169 OP 195 DO 10.3368/le.91.1.169 VO 91 IS 1 A1 Abbott, Joshua K. A1 Haynie, Alan C. A1 Reimer, Matthew N. YR 2015 UL http://le.uwpress.org/content/91/1/169.abstract AB The degree to which selectivity in fisheries is malleable to changes in incentive structures is critical for policy design. We examine data for a multispecies trawl fishery before and after a transition from management under common-pool quotas to a fishery cooperative and note a substantial shift in postcooperative catch from bycatch and toward valuable target species. We examine the margins used to affect catch composition, finding that large- and fine-scale spatial decision making and avoidance of night-fishing were critical. We argue that the poor incentives for selectivity in many systems may obscure significant flexibility in multispecies production technologies. (JEL Q22, Q28)