RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Resource Rent in Individual Quota Fisheries
JF Land Economics
JO Land Econ
FD University of Wisconsin Press
SP 279
OP 291
DO 10.3368/le.85.2.279
VO 85
IS 2
A1 Asche, Frank
A1 Bjørndal, Trond
A1 Gordon, Daniel V.
YR 2009
UL http://le.uwpress.org/content/85/2/279.abstract
AB Traditional fisheries management schemes generate incentives for vessels to maximize catch, resulting in rent dissipation and overcapacity. Individual vessel quota management schemes change the incentives to maximize profit and have the potential to generate resource rent and reduce capacity. An interesting question is whether it is the changed incentives due to individual quota or the capacity reduction due to transferability of individual quota that is most important in generating rent. In this study, a cost function approach is used to model and measure rent generated and potential rent in a fishery managed with individual vessel quotas. (JEL C30, Q22)