<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><xml><records><record><source-app name="HighWire" version="7.x">Drupal-HighWire</source-app><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vorlaufer, Miriam</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ibanez, Marcela</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Juanda, Bambang</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wollni, Meike</style></author></authors><secondary-authors></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Conservation versus Equity: Can Payments for Environmental Services Achieve Both?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Land Economics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017-11-01 00:00:00</style></date></pub-dates></dates><pages><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">667-688</style></pages><doi><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10.3368/le.93.4.667</style></doi><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">93</style></volume><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><abstract><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Based on a framed field experiment, we investigate the trade-off between conservation and equity in the use of payments for environmental services (PES). We compare the effects of two PES schemes that implicitly incorporate different distributive justice principles: a flat-rate payment per biophysical unit conserved and a redistributive payment based on the Rawls maxi-min distributional principle. The main findings indicate that the introduction of a redistributive scheme can function as a multipurpose instrument. Under the assumed condition that participants with lower endowments face higher opportunity costs of conservation, it realigns the income distribution in favor of low-endowed participants without compromising conservation outcomes. (JEL Q15, Q57)</style></abstract></record></records></xml>