TY - JOUR T1 - Funding Public Goods Through Dedicated Taxes on Private Goods JF - Land Economics JO - Land Econ DO - 10.3368/le.98.3.082721-0101 SP - 082721-0101 AU - Nathan W. Chan AU - Matthew J. Kotchen Y1 - 2021/12/27 UR - http://le.uwpress.org/content/early/2021/12/15/le.98.3.082721-0101.abstract N2 - We examine dedicated taxes, i.e., taxes on private goods used to finance public good provision, in a game-theoretic model of impure public goods. We show that a dedicated tax can increase or decrease demand for the taxed good. The optimal dedicated tax cannot, in general, achieve the Pareto optimal allocation, but it can generate a conditionally efficient equilibrium with comparatively more or less public good provision, depending, in part, on complementarity or substitutability between the private and public good. We also demonstrate a neutrality result: when individuals can make direct donations, sufficiently low dedicated taxes will not impact equilibrium allocation. ER -