TY - JOUR T1 - Funding Public Goods through Dedicated Taxes on Private Goods JF - Land Economics JO - Land Econ SP - 428 LP - 439 DO - 10.3368/le.98.3.082721-0101 VL - 98 IS - 3 AU - Nathan W. Chan AU - Matthew J. Kotchen Y1 - 2022/08/01 UR - http://le.uwpress.org/content/98/3/428.abstract N2 - We examine dedicated taxes (i.e., taxes on private goods used to finance public good provision) in a game-theoretic model of impure public goods. We show that a dedicated tax can increase or decrease demand for the taxed good. The optimal dedicated tax generally cannot achieve the Pareto-optimal allocation, but it can generate a conditionally efficient equilibrium with comparatively more or less public good provision, depending in part on complementarity or substitutability between the private and public good. We also demonstrate a neutrality result: when individuals can make direct donations, sufficiently low dedicated taxes will not impact equilibrium allocation. ER -