RT Journal Article SR Electronic T1 Funding Public Goods through Dedicated Taxes on Private Goods JF Land Economics JO Land Econ FD University of Wisconsin Press SP 428 OP 439 DO 10.3368/le.98.3.082721-0101 VO 98 IS 3 A1 Chan, Nathan W. A1 Kotchen, Matthew J. YR 2022 UL http://le.uwpress.org/content/98/3/428.abstract AB We examine dedicated taxes (i.e., taxes on private goods used to finance public good provision) in a game-theoretic model of impure public goods. We show that a dedicated tax can increase or decrease demand for the taxed good. The optimal dedicated tax generally cannot achieve the Pareto-optimal allocation, but it can generate a conditionally efficient equilibrium with comparatively more or less public good provision, depending in part on complementarity or substitutability between the private and public good. We also demonstrate a neutrality result: when individuals can make direct donations, sufficiently low dedicated taxes will not impact equilibrium allocation.