RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Stewardship Signaling and Use of Social Pressure to Reduce Nonpoint Source Pollution
JF Land Economics
JO Land Econ
FD University of Wisconsin Press
SP 618
OP 638
DO 10.3368/le.98.4.041820-0056R1
VO 98
IS 4
A1 Leah H. Palm-Forster
A1 Mark Griesinger
A1 Julianna M. Butler
A1 Jacob R. Fooks
A1 Kent D. Messer
YR 2022
UL http://le.uwpress.org/content/98/4/618.abstract
AB Nonpoint source pollution persists in agricultural landscapes, and policy makers are increasingly interested in opportunities to reduce pollution using behavioral approaches in lieu of regulations or increased financial incentives. We use a laboratory experiment to analyze how stewardship signaling and social pressure affect management decisions with environmental consequences. We find that stewardship signaling and, to some extent, social pressures increase adoption of a pollution-abatement technology, but the effect on social net benefit depends on the relative cost of technology adoption and the economic benefits of pollution reduction. Our results have implications for agri-environmental programs that publicly recognize environmental stewardship.