RT Journal Article SR Electronic T1 Tenant Favoritism and Right of First Refusals in Farmland Auctions: Competition and Price Effects JF Land Economics JO Land Econ FD University of Wisconsin Press SP 080721-0091R1 DO 10.3368/le.080721-0091R1 A1 Lars Isenhardt A1 Stefan Seifert A1 Silke Hüttel YR 2022 UL http://le.uwpress.org/content/early/2022/08/16/le.080721-0091R1.abstract AB Rights of First Refusals (RFRs) granted to tenants in land privatization auctions enable them to purchase their leased land by accepting the highest bid. RFRs may however deter bidders and incentivize non-right holders to adjust their bidding. We conjecture that tenant favoritism with RFRs reduces competition and thus sales prices at the expense of the public sellers. To test the conjectures, we compile a dataset of land auctions by two privatization agencies in eastern Germany, one favoring tenants along with an RFR, between 2007 and 2018. Double-robust matching results indicate RFR-related reductions in the number of bidders and prices.