PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - Lars Isenhardt
AU  - Stefan Seifert
AU  - Silke Hüttel
TI  - Tenant Favoritism and Right of First Refusals in Farmland Auctions
AID  - 10.3368/le.080721-0091R1
DP  - 2023 May 01
TA  - Land Economics
PG  - 302--324
VI  - 99
IP  - 2
4099  - http://le.uwpress.org/content/99/2/302.short
4100  - http://le.uwpress.org/content/99/2/302.full
SO  - Land Econ2023 May 01; 99
AB  - Rights of first refusals (RFRs) granted to tenants in land privatization auctions enable them to purchase their leased land by accepting the highest bid. RFRs may deter bidders and incentivize non–right holders to adjust their bidding. We conjecture that tenant favoritism with RFRs reduces competition and thus sales prices at the expense of the public sellers. To test the conjectures, we compile a data set of land auctions by two privatization agencies in eastern Germany, one favoring tenants along with an RFR, between 2007 and 2018. Double robust matching results indicate RFR-related reductions in the number of bidders and prices.