RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Spatial Bioinvasion Externalities with Heterogeneous Landowner Preferences: A Two-Agent Bioeconomic Model
JF Land Economics
FD University of Wisconsin Press
SP 262
OP 283
DO 10.3368/le.101.2.112024-0209
VO 101
IS 2
A1 Atallah, Shady S.
YR 2025
UL http://le.uwpress.org/content/101/2/262.abstract
AB Preference heterogeneity among landowners managing transboundary resources can determine the production of externalities across their lands. I test this hypothesis in the context of an invasive species affecting two forest landowners, where one values their property for recreation and the other produces timber. Using a spatially explicit first-mover repeated game, I find that the social cost of the externality is greatest when a bioinvasion starts on the recreation property. Except for species with fast long-distance dispersal, the optimal subsidy is nonuniform, targeting the landowner who acts as the weaker link, regardless of where a bioinvasion starts.