<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><xml><records><record><source-app name="HighWire" version="7.x">Drupal-HighWire</source-app><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hughes, Jonathan E.</style></author></authors><secondary-authors></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Online Reservation Systems, Buying Frenzies and Equitable Access to Public Lands</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Land Economics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2026</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2026-07-26 12:22:54</style></date></pub-dates></dates><elocation-id><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">090225-0075R</style></elocation-id><doi><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10.3368/le.103.1.090225-0075R</style></doi><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%"></style></volume><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%"></style></issue><abstract><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rationed access is an important tool to promote sustainable use of public lands. However, online reservation systems can lead to “buying frenzies” when low prices create excess demand. Using transaction-level data for river permits in the United States sold both by reservation-system buying frenzy and lottery, I show successful frenzy buyers reside in wealthier zip codes than those selected at random. This effect increases with congestion and leads to an unequal distribution of consumption benefits where high-income zip codes receive 25 percent more recreational trip value. These effects can undermine park managers’ efforts to provide equitable access through low fees.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>