TABLE 5

Solution Strategy Pairs and Expected Payoffs; Disease Starts in G_L.

Case	Price^{^a} (dollars/ton) p_H,Healthy, p_L,Healthy, and penalty pairs (%) p_H,Infected p_L,Infected	Setting	Expected Payoffs
Case		Setting	Solution Strategy Pairs G_H, G_L	G_H, G_L ($1,000/ acre)	ENPV_T Total
1	1,912, 1,912 34, 34	Simultaneous	I_mNS, I_mNS	17, 150	167
		Sequential, G_L moves first	I_mNS, I_mNS	17, 150	167
		Sequential, G_H moves first	I_mNS, I_mNS	17, 150	167
2	2,198, 1,626 40, 28	Simultaneous	I_mNS, I_mNS	35, 121	156
		Sequential, G_L moves first	I_mNS, I_mNS	35, 121	156
		Sequential, G_H moves first	I_mNS, I_mNS	35, 121	156
3	2,485, 1,339 46, 22	Simultaneous	I_mNS, I_mNS	54, 92	146
		Sequential, G_L moves first	I_mNS, I_mNS	54, 92	146
		Sequential, G_H moves first	I_mNS, I_mNS	54, 92	146
4	2,771, 1,053 52, 16	Simultaneous	I_mNS, I_mNS	72, 62	134
		Sequential, G_L moves first	I_mNS, I_mNS	72, 62	134
		Sequential, G_H moves first	I_mNS, I_mNS	72, 62	134
5	3,058, 766 58, 10	Social planner^{^b}	I_mNS, I_mNS	91, 31	121
		Simultaneous	No control, No control	60, 22	82
		Sequential, G_L moves first	No control, No control	60, 22	82
		Sequential, G_H moves first	I_mNS, I_mNS	91, 31	121
		Nash bargaining^{^b}	I_mNS, I_mNS	80, 42	121

↵^a Recall that prices in cases 1 through 4 are obtained through a mean-preserving contraction of prices in the baseline case (case 5). They represent observed grape prices for Cabernet franc in the Napa County Grape Price District (California Department of Food and Agriculture 2014).
↵^b We report the social planner and Nash bargaining solutions only when they are different from the noncooperative solutions.