Conclusions on the Impacts of Tenure Security on Deforestation
| Authors | Region | Proxies Used in Analysis | Concluded Influence of Security |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bohn and Deacon 2000 | Cross-country | Political stability | Decreases deforestation |
| Cattaneo 2001 | Brazilian Amazon | Duration of residence | Decreases deforestation |
| Deacon 1994 | 120 countries | Political stability | Decreases deforestation |
| Deacon 1999 | Historical accounts | Political stability | Decreases deforestation |
| Godoy et al. 1998 | Bolivia | Conflict with abutters | Conflict with all abutters jointly significant; only conflict with ranchers individually significantly increased deforestation |
| Godoy, Kirby, and Wilkie 2001 | Bolivia | Conflict with abutters and duration of residence | No significant impact |
| Otsuka et al. 2001 | Sumatra | Tenure type | No significant impact |
| Owubah et al. 2001 | Ghana | Capability to legally register land | No significant impact |
| Place and Otsuka 2001 | Malawi | Method of acquiring land | Significant impacts in some regions, but with differing directions of impact |
| Southgate, Sierra, and Brown 1991 | Ecuador | Ratio of adjudicated agricultural land relative to entire study area | Decreases deforestation |