Table 2.

Simulation Results Use of Time

 Use of Time
InstitutionVelocity (knots)Pot Lifts per Fishing DaySoak Time (days)Fishing DaysTrips
(a) LE23212.5143.61.243.711
(b) LE7812.5160.11.746.451
(c) IQ2325.9461.41.055.431
(d) IQ786.5585.21.4910.292
 Use of Space
InstitutionPotsDistance (nm)Inverse Cong. IndexOwn Inverse Cong. Index
(a) LE232178.611.100.7160.974 
(b) LE78278.880.890.9610.977 
(c) IQ23264.671.850.9750.981 
(d) IQ78126.651.330.9790.982 
 Production/Rents
InstitutionCatch per Day (crabs)Avg. Variable Cost ($/crab)Rents per Vessel ($)Total Rents ($)
(a) LE2322,5812.24234,37054,373,840 
(b) LE784,4121.18795,85062,076,300 
(c) IQ2321,7621.10244,59056,744,880 
(d) IQ782,7650.81810,22063,197,160 
  • Note: The total effect of ITQ introduction is row (a) vs. row (d) (treatment A). The incentive effect is row

    (a) vs. row (c) (treatment B) or row (b) vs. row (d) (treatment C). The consolidation effect is row (a) vs. row

    (b) (treatment D) or row (c) vs. row (d) (treatment E). The rents reported here are measured before payments to labor, reflecting the nature of the share system in the red king crab fishery.